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‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the 
watchers, who will guard the guardians?’1 As legislative and regulatory processes around 
the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, 
(Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn and Tetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the 
regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and benefi cial, it can also impose 
its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embrac-
ing, regulatory oversight – frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evalua-
tion. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new 
set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend 
to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They 
review the fl ow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefi t- cost analysis, 
and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory 
burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an inte-
gral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their 
respective administrative systems.
Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the 
quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefi t- cost analy-
sis, this chapter instead identifi es the key concepts and issues surrounding the establish-
ment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and 
comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and 
in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional 
designs and scope of oversight.
1. The rationale for the establishment of ROBs
1.1. Why oversee the regulators?
Wherever societies engage in economic activity (which is to say everywhere), demand 
arises for regulation by the state to curb the undesirable impacts of that activity. In 
the real world of imperfect markets, regulations can be necessary to correct market 
failures such as externalities (e.g. health, safety and environmental risks), asymmetric 
1 Juvenal was asking who would oversee those assigned to guard the queen’s fi delity during 
the  king’s absence, lest those guards betray their own duty. See Satires, Book 2: Satire VI, 
6.029–34.
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 information (e.g. in fi nancial or labor markets), and market power (e.g. entry barriers), 
as well as correcting other problems such as unfair discrimination.
Although regulation can solve such social problems, it can also impose its own prob-
lems, including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary risks, and rent- 
seeking. Regulators may make mistakes, may choose poorly designed regulations, may 
neglect social goals other than their own narrow mission (Breyer 1993), 2 may neglect 
the adverse impacts of their decisions, may aggrandise their own power, or may serve 
the interests of narrow groups rather than promoting broader public well- being (Kolko 
1965, Ackerman and Hassler 1981). Regulators may pursue policies that reduce some 
risks while introducing new risks or shifting risks to other populations (risk- risk trade-
off s), where regulators are hampered by limited information, bounded decision domains, 
or the omitted voice of the aff ected populations (Graham and Wiener 1995). Political 
scientists and institutional economists have emphasized that in democracies, government 
decisions are not taken by a single ruler but instead represent a complex aggregation of 
preferences advocated by specifi c interest groups and often mediated through contending 
institutions. Because learning about issues and expressing political voice are costly, the 
shared general interests of the public at large may go underrepresented while the narrow 
interests of pressure groups are trumpeted (Olson 1971, Wiener and Richman 2010).3
As a result, wherever states deploy regulation, demand arises for oversight of the 
regulatory system to reduce the costs and side eff ects of regulation, promote effi  ciency in 
standard- setting and instrument choice, encourage consistency and transparency, ensure 
accountability, and improve the overall social outcomes of regulation. Regulatory 
oversight, particularly oversight by a centralized governmental body, has increasingly 
been seen as an eff ective mechanism for improving regulation. Regulatory oversight can 
be defi ned as ‘hierarchical supervision of regulatory action by executive and legislative 
actors’ (Lindseth et al. 2008: 3).
1.2. How to oversee the regulators?
The aim of regulatory oversight is both democratic and technocratic: to enhance the 
accountability of regulatory agencies to democratically elected offi  cials, and to use 
analytic methods to improve the overall social outcomes of regulation by reducing the 
costs and side eff ects and increasing the benefi ts. Regulatory oversight, as it is gener-
ally carried out, uses several analytical tools which are heavily informed by economic 
analysis. The analytic tools that are generally employed have been discussed at length in 
the academic literature (Revesz and Livermore 2008, Graham 2008, Adler and Posner 
2001, Adler and Posner 2006), and also in several OECD reports (Deighton- Smith 2007, 
2006, OECD 2009). These tools include: impact assessment (IA) of proposed legislation;4 
2 This may occur, for example, where regulators are pushed by legislatures or advocacy groups, 
such as consumer and environmental groups, to regulate despite (or overlooking) the social costs, 
or where regulators overestimate the risk to be regulated. See Breyer (1993).
3 A classic on this point is Olson (1971). For further discussion of the political economy of 
regulatory design, see Wiener and Barak Richman (2010).
4 IA can be defi ned as the process of systematic analysis of the likely impacts of a policy or 
intervention by public authorities. It may employ each of the analytic tools noted here. An IA also 
refers to the report or document containing such an analysis. 
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benefi t- cost analysis (BCA) and cost- eff ectiveness analysis (Graham 2008, Revesz and 
Livermore 2008, Wiener 2006);5 risk- risk tradeoff  analysis (Graham and Wiener 1995, 
Revesz and Livermore 2008);6 and scientifi c analyses (Bagley and Revesz 2006).7 Other 
tasks may involve simplifi cation of existing legislation and regulation (through codifi -
cation, recasting, and repeal) (Beslier and Lavaggi 2006); consultation procedures on 
drafting proposals;8 screening and withdrawal of pending proposals;9 and monitoring 
and  reducing administrative burdens.10
1.3. Who oversees the regulators?
The analytical tools and methodologies that are typically employed in regulatory over-
sight could, in principle, be employed by a variety of actors, including legislatures or 
their accountability arms, courts, auditors, executive offi  cials, advisory bodies, review 
commissions, and non- governmental organizations. The distinctive institutional devel-
opment of the past four decades in the US and during the past decade in Europe has 
been the emergence of regulatory oversight bodies (ROBs) to ‘watch the watchers’. A 
typical ROB is an offi  ce in the executive branch (center of government) charged with 
supervising regulation government- wide. Some countries also have ROBs in the parlia-
ment or legislature. As shown below, both the US and the EU centralize regulatory 
oversight functions within the executive branch, though under diff erent institutional 
designs.
One key attribute of any ROB is expertise, in the form of a trained professional staff  
capable of undertaking technical evaluation of regulatory impacts and options. These 
staff  may be economists, but also may include experts in other fi elds of social science, 
law and policy, life science and physical science. As Adam Smith observed, expertise can 
be an antidote to passion – to politicized distortions of regulation – or at least a means 
to reveal and make transparent the signifi cant impacts, tradeoff s, and alternatives of 
regulatory choices and to inform decision makers and the public of the promises and 
pitfalls of regulation. By contrast, any ROB lacking expertise or headed by a non- expert 
political appointee may simply exercise politicized infl uence over expert regulators and 
thereby undercut the ROB’s perceived legitimacy.11
 5 While BCA compares benefi ts and costs, seeking to maximize net benefi ts, cost- eff ectiveness 
seeks to minimize cost for a given objective or maximize benefi ts for a given cost. For further dis-
cussion of degrees of quantifi cation in IA, see Graham (2008), Revesz and Livermore (2008), and 
Wiener (2006).
 6 Including both ancillary harms and ancillary benefi ts. See Graham and Wiener (1995), 
Revesz and Livermore (2008).
 7 See Bagley and Revesz (2006) (advocating centralized coordination of agency science). The 
US Information Quality Act of 2001 calls for centralized review of the quality of agency data and 
publications.
 8 Commission communication, ‘General principles and minimum standards for consultation 
of interested parties by the Commission’, COM(2002) 704 (hereinafter ‘minimum standards’). See, 
on this initiative, Obradovic and Vizcaino (2006).
 9 For an insightful analysis on this initiative in the EU, see Allio (2008).
10 See Commission Communication, ‘Action programme for reducing administrative burdens 
in the EU’, COM(2007) 23 fi nal.
11 Judicial oversight generally involves generalist professionals who are not experts in one 
regulatory topic, but who are experts in administrative law, and who are ideally independent, 
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A second key attribute of any ROB is political accountability, such as accountability 
to the center of government (e.g. the President or Prime Minister) or to a powerful min-
istry (such as budget/fi nance), to ensure that regulation serves the program of these high- 
level offi  cials who are in turn accountable to the electorate (Lindseth et al. 2008, Bickel 
1986, Tushnet 1995, Ackerman 1993, 1998).12 Political accountability enhances the 
ability of ROBs to infl uence regulators who also have their own political constituencies. 
Just as regulators need oversight, so too ROBs warrant oversight, by the President or 
Prime Minister, by the legislature or parliament, perhaps by courts,13 and by the public.
Any ROB faces possible tensions between these two key attributes. Expert techno-
cratic criteria for regulation may or may not coincide with political democratic criteria. 
That is, the President’s or Prime Minister’s (or legislature’s) policy program may diff er 
from the experts’ advice regarding the optimal policy (Shapiro 2006, Graham 2007b). In 
such cases, the ROB may need to explain its expert technical analysis to a political leader 
with a diff erent priority and try to convince the leader to change course, or the ROB 
may help make the impacts and tradeoff s transparent while recognizing that the political 
leader’s priority will override the ROB’s expert technical analysis.
The ROB may have both a need for independence from political micro- management, 
to assure its neutrality and technocratic objectivity, and simultaneously a need to be 
close to power in order to have authority over other ministries and to carry forward the 
President’s (or Prime Minister’s) regulatory agenda (E. Kagan 2001). In some cases, this 
tension can become acute.
Like any government body, a ROB may seek external social support to maintain its 
own budget and infl uence. If that support comes predominantly from advocacy groups 
on one side of a debate (e.g. business groups), this may compromise the perceived legiti-
macy of the ROB’s advice. Meanwhile, ROBs may also need to have their own external 
advisory bodies to off er useful insight and feedback, both on advances in technical ana-
lytic methods and on emerging issues in regulatory policy (OECD 2007a).
These internal and external tensions are partly mediated through the rules for the 
appointment and removal of ROB offi  cials. Therefore, an analysis of ROBs needs to 
address questions such as: Who has the power to appoint and remove the head of the 
ROB? How does the power to appoint/remove offi  cials aff ect the performance of the 
ROB? What kind of expertise does the ROB have, or should it have? How does the ROB 
use its expertise and its political position to infl uence regulatory quality and decisions? 
Should political offi  cials instruct the ROB on particular regulatory decisions (and do 
they)? These are some of the questions that we address in the following sections, focusing 
on the US and EU experiences with ROBs.
maintaining their perceived legitimacy by being shielded from political infl uence via secure job 
tenure (though in reality judges may also be infl uenced by political affi  liations).
12 See Lindseth et al. (2008). Judicial review is typically not accountable to the electorate, but 
rather derives its legitimacy from its independence from politics. Its infl uence is generally defi ned 
as counter- majoritarian.
13 In the US, the Offi  ce of Management and Budget (OMB)/Offi  ce of Information and 
Regulatory Aff airs (OIRA) has not been subject to judicial review; Revesz and Livermore propose 
that OIRA’s issuance of key oversight guidelines should be subject to judicial review similar to 
rulemaking by regulatory agencies. Revesz and Livermore (2008: 172).
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2. Origins of ROBs
A brief historical perspective can help to illustrate the origins and objectives of these 
bodies in OECD countries. In the past, countries with a Roman law tradition set up 
forms of ROBs, as part of Councils of State, as in France (Robineau and Truchet 
2002) and Italy (Caretti and De Siervo 1996). These bodies served as advisors to the 
government on the legality of regulatory decisions. They were also the superior level of 
the administrative courts, so they also exercised an adjudicative role meant to protect 
governments and avoid litigation in the civil courts regarding specifi c regulations. For 
example, in France after the Revolution, the Conseil d’Etat and the system of admin-
istrative courts were designed to shield the administrative state from being unduly 
constrained by the separate system of civil courts; the civil court judges were viewed as 
more sympathetic to the monarchy, while the administrative courts were meant to be 
more sympathetic to the legislature and to its eff orts to redistribute power and wealth in 
France after the Revolution. Today, the Conseil d’Etat, acting as both a court of appeals 
for the administrative courts and a supervisory body for the administrative state, brings 
signifi cant expertise to bear on the legality of regulatory decisions (Breyer 1993, Part III). 
However, it does not review impact assessments of proposed new regulations prepared 
by regulatory agencies (Bouder 2008, Trosa 2008).
Modern ROBs, established since the 1970s, especially in common law countries 
such as the USA and UK, but also in other countries such as the Netherlands, and in 
the European Union, have a diff erent origin. They were mainly created in response to 
stagnating economic conditions; a rising tide of regulation of health, safety and environ-
mental risks; an accumulated array of economic regulation of sectors such as banking, 
communications, and transportation; and an academic literature on both the need for 
and problems with regulation.
2.1. The origin of the US Offi  ce of Information and Regulatory Aff airs
In the late 18th century, the US Constitution’s strategy of checks and balances among 
branches of government was designed to avoid the concentration of power that existed in 
monarchic regimes. By the 20th century, that foundational strategy continued to animate 
the evolution of regulatory oversight. The US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
enacted in 1946 was a response to the ‘New Deal’ expansion of federal regulation in the 
1930s and 1940s. In turn, the US Executive Orders on regulatory impact assessment issued 
beginning in the 1970s were, in part, a response to the ‘Great Society’ expansion of health 
and environmental legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the slowing economy, accu-
mulated economic regulation, and academic analysis. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter, a 
Democrat, issued Executive Order (EO) 12044, requiring economic analysis of new regu-
lations, and he created the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), an interagency 
working group that gathered when needed to review these economic analyses. Then in 
1980, the US Offi  ce of Information and Regulatory Aff airs (OIRA) within the Offi  ce of 
Management and Budget (OMB) was established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1980. OIRA was thus located in the Executive Offi  ce of the President. The Administrator 
of OIRA is appointed by the President and, since the 1986 amendments to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (Pub. L. 99- 591), is subject to confi rmation by the Senate. OIRA has 
approximately 50 expert non- political staff . Whereas the RARG had been an interagency 
group that met on occasion, OIRA is a standing centralized expert oversight body.
M2455 - ROSE-ACKERMAN TEXT.indd   313 30/09/2010   09:32
314  Comparative administrative law
When Ronald Reagan (a Republican) became President in 1981, he promptly issued 
Executive Order (EO) 12291 (February 1981), formally giving OIRA the role and 
authority of a ROB. The Reagan EO required agencies to conduct regulatory impact 
assessments using benefi t- cost analysis, to ensure that regulations’ benefi ts ‘outweigh’ 
their costs, and to submit those IAs to OIRA for review, while giving OIRA the power 
to ‘return’ an unsatisfactory regulation or IA to the agency. Some viewed the EO as an 
intrusion into the agencies’ duty to carry out statutory instructions from the Congress; 
but the EO expressly provided that it did not override statutes, and others replied that 
in any case the President still has the authority to manage the executive branch. It also 
received criticism from those who saw it as anti- regulatory. President George H.W. Bush 
continued OIRA’s role under EO 12291.
After Bill Clinton, a Democrat, became President in 1993, there was much speculation 
that he might issue a new EO diminishing OIRA’s role in regulatory oversight. Instead, 
Clinton’s EO 12866 (September 1993) reaffi  rmed the basic role of OIRA in reviewing 
agencies’ policy proposals and regulatory IAs using benefi t- cost analysis. It replaced the 
word ‘outweigh’ with the word ‘justify’, thereby emphasizing the importance of qualita-
tive as well as quantitative criteria, and orienting benefi t- cost analysis to be ‘a tool not a 
rule’ – informing the considered judgments of publicly accountable offi  cials, not dictat-
ing decisions arithmetically. Clinton’s EO also broadened the scope of the impacts to be 
considered in IAs to include distributional impacts and ancillary impacts, and enhanced 
the transparency of OIRA review. The Clinton administration also issued best practice 
guidelines on preparing IAs.
George W. Bush was elected president in the contentious 2000 election, and soon 
speculation arose again that he might issue a new EO enhancing OIRA’s oversight role. 
Instead, Bush retained Clinton’s EO 12866 (with only minor modifi cations made in 
his second term, such as adding coverage of agency ‘guidance documents’ through EO 
13422 in January 2007). During the Bush administration, OIRA also issued guidelines on 
the conduct of IA, notably through Circular A- 4 in September 2003.
Just after his inauguration as President in January 2009, Barack Obama rescinded his 
predecessor’s EO 13422,14 but left in place EO 12866 as issued by President Clinton. At 
the same time, President Obama also issued a request for recommendations on a new 
EO on regulatory oversight, listing several topics to be addressed, but implying that he 
would continue the basic approach of requiring regulatory review by OIRA.15 As of 
January 2010, he had not yet issued a new EO.
Thus, the creation and role of OIRA refl ects a bipartisan consensus – at least among 
the US Presidents of the last four decades – that the executive branch needs tools to 
oversee the regulatory state and manage its choices, employing both expert analysis 
14 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (February 4, 2009).
15 President Barack Obama, Memorandum of January 30, 2009 – Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 5977 (published February 3, 2009). President Obama directed the the Offi  ce of Management 
and Budget (OMB), in consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, to produce within 
100 days a set of recommendations for a new Executive Order on regulatory review. OMB then 
invited public comment, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (February 26, 2009), and more than 180 public com-
ments were received by April 20, 2009. These memoranda and the public comments received are 
posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regmatters/.
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and political accountability, regardless of which political party is in power (E. Kagan 
2001).
2.2. The origin of the EU’s Impact Assessment Board
In Europe, regulatory review was not formally established until after 2000. Nonetheless, 
this history refl ects the same pattern seen in the US, in which the ROB is created in 
response to the growth of the regulatory state.
The European Union (EU) launched its formal impact assessment (IA) procedure 
in 2002 as a regulatory review system within the European Commission. This process 
scrutinizes the quality of IAs conducted by the Commission services (Directorates- 
General, or DGs) on proposals for new policies. From 2002 to 2006, these IAs were 
shared among the Commission; then in November 2006, an ROB was established to 
oversee the IA process: the EU Impact Assessment Board (IAB), located in the offi  ce 
of the Secretariat- General of the European Commission. The IAB grew out of the 
‘Better Regulation’ initiative (Wiener 2006), which was spurred by the Lisbon Agenda 
and the Mandelkern Report of 2001.16 The Commission issued Impact Assessment 
Guidelines in 2003, revised them in 2005, and updated them in 2006, before they were 
replaced by new ones in 2009.17 The IAB’s primary role is to oversee the quality of 
the IAs produced by the Directorates- General (DGs) when the latter propose new 
policies. The IAB is a fi ve- member board made up of representatives from several 
DGs and chaired by the Deputy Secretary- General; this structure is more akin to the 
interagency RARG than to the standing body of OIRA with its single Administrator 
and permanent staff .
As in the US, albeit with a diff erent institutional history and structure, the EU Better 
Regulation initiative and its Impact Assessment program, including the creation of the 
IAB, have been in part a response to the growth of EU- level regulation, notably fol-
lowing the 1987 Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Alemanno 2008: 
45–6). The EU’s adoption of the IA review process was also a way to support the Lisbon 
strategy for economic advance.18 The setting up of the IAB drew lessons from the US, but 
also from the UK and Swedish examples, where signifi cant improvements in the regula-
tory frameworks and deregulation had been seen as associated with renewed economic 
growth (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007). As in the US, regulatory oversight achieved a 
kind of bipartisan consensus in the EU: The EU Better Regulation initiative and the IA 
process have been supported through varying presidencies of the Commission, including 
both Presidents Romano Prodi and José Manuel Barroso, and have also been endorsed 
by the Council of the EU.19
16 The fi nal Mandelkern report on Better Regulation was fi nalized in February 2001 and pub-
lished on 13 November 2001.
17 European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009) 92.
18 The EU Better Regulation strategy is a centerpiece of the renewed ‘Lisbon Strategy’, which 
aimed at turning Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- based economy in 
the world by 2010. See European Commission’s ‘Partnership for Growth and Jobs’ – the renewed 
‘Lisbon Strategy’ launched in Spring 2005. 
19 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council on Better 
Regulation, December 3–4, 2009.
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2.3. Other examples of ROBs
These trends have been mirrored in many other countries and jurisdictions, gradually 
spreading across almost all OECD countries. For example, the UK has had a Regulatory 
Impact Unit, followed by a Better Regulation Executive, with an advisory body called 
the Better Regulation Task Force; these were succeeded by the Better Regulation 
Commission in 2006, and in turn by the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council in 2008, 
as well as being accompanied by additional scrutiny from the National Audit Offi  ce, the 
Panel for Regulatory Accountability, and the House of Commons. The Netherlands 
program to reduce administrative costs was overseen by the Inter- ministerial Project 
Team (IPAL) in the Ministry of Finance, with external scrutiny by the Advisory Board 
on Administrative Burdens (ACTAL) (OECD 2007b). Countries such as Mexico, with 
COFEMER (Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria) following the previous example 
of the Economic Deregulation Unit (UDE), and Korea have also set up ROBs, infl u-
enced by examples in other OECD countries and by advice from the OECD. At the EU 
level, the European Court of Auditors (an institution created to audit the EU budget) 
has also indicated some interest in performing a role in regulatory oversight.
3. Structure: constitutional and institutional design of ROBs
ROBs could in principle be located in any branch of government. Thus, they might be 
established within the executive/administrative branch (for example, as an interagency 
working group; as an offi  ce of the president or prime minister; as an independent govern-
ment watchdog offi  ce such as an auditor or ombudsman or inspector general; or at a gov-
ernment ministry for reform of regulation or state reform); within the legislative branch 
(as a legislative committee or a technical body attached to the legislature); or within the 
judicial branch (indeed judicial review functions as a kind of ROB, with the authority to 
reject regulatory decisions, though typically without the expertise and routine oversight 
role of an executive branch ROB). The function of ROBs may also be carried out, in 
part, by external advisory groups, national academies of science, or other external non-
governmental actors such as advocacy groups, think tanks, academic researchers, and 
the news media. Although such groups may be expert and may conduct and publicize 
their reviews of regulatory IAs, they typically lack the authority to determine choices 
by the regulators. Within a multi- level governance system such as a federal republic or 
supranational union, the tasks of ROBs may also be exercised by the member states of 
the Union or federation.
The choice among these locations is always a question of comparative institutional 
analysis: Which institution is best equipped and best placed to perform oversight in 
each system of governance? In making such choices, there may be tradeoff s among cri-
teria such as expertise, authority, transparency, and political accountability. Diff erent 
 constitutional structures may thus warrant diff erent optimal locations.
3.1. The location of OIRA in the US structure of government
In the US, the location of the main ROB, OIRA, is in the Executive Offi  ce of the 
President. The OIRA Administrator is appointed by the President, with confi rmation by 
the Senate. The OIRA Administrator reports to the Director of Offi  ce of Management 
and Budget (OMB), and then to the President.
The location of OIRA refl ects the horizontal separation of powers in the US federal 
M2455 - ROSE-ACKERMAN TEXT.indd   316 30/09/2010   09:32
Comparing regulatory oversight bodies across the Atlantic   317
government. OIRA enables the President to manage the regulatory powers deployed 
by the legislature (the Congress). In response to New Deal expansion of federal regula-
tory state, the courts were asked by petitioners to undertake judicial review of agency 
regulation. In 1946, Congress, with the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), gave courts the authority to enforce provisions that required notice and public 
comment when agencies make rules, and to be sure that regulations are not ‘arbitrary or 
capricious’. Three decades later, in response to the Great Society expansion of federal 
regulation in the 1960s, the courts intensifi ed their review by allowing increased access 
to the courts for advocacy groups and by adopting the ‘hard look’ doctrine in the 1970s. 
But active judicial review of agency action was seen by presidents as insuffi  cient, because 
judicial review is episodic, conducted by non- expert judges without staff  resources, not 
always subject to benefi t- cost criteria, and not accountable to the President’s policy 
agenda. Meanwhile, federal regulatory agencies were a contested terrain in the US con-
stitutional structure: they conduct executive branch functions (with heads appointed by 
the President with Senate confi rmation), and are also agents of the Congress exercising 
delegated legislative power, and they may perform adjudicatory functions as well.20
Although OIRA’s initial focus was on paperwork reduction – reducing the administra-
tive burden of government requests for information – it soon took on a role in overseeing 
regulation. OIRA has substantially, although not exclusively, been oriented as a way 
for the executive to check or shape legislative (Congressional) pressure to regulate. But 
OIRA operates only at the second stage, reviewing agencies’ implementing regulations, 
not reviewing the legislation initially enacted by the Congress itself. OIRA review has 
historically been aimed primarily (though not exclusively) at countering the agencies’ 
mission- driven tunnel vision, to check proposed regulations whose benefi ts do not justify 
their costs (or to help revise those proposals to better maximize net benefi ts) – though 
some argue that public choice theory implies that agencies will regulate too little.21 One 
response to the latter concern has been the innovation of ‘prompt’ letters, which were 
introduced, interestingly, in the George W. Bush administration, and which enable 
OIRA to ask an agency to consider adopting a new regulation (Graham 2007a).
The US has no IA process nor ROB to oversee Congressional legislation itself. 
Compared to the courts and the executive branch, Congress has played a smaller role 
in regulatory review. Congress holds periodic committee hearings on specifi c policy 
areas. The General Accountability Offi  ce (GAO) attached to the Congress issues 
occasional reports on regulatory matters. The Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO) 
estimates the impacts of new laws on federal government spending and revenues, but 
not usually on private sector costs and benefi ts. Congress did enact the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA 1995), calling for nonbinding analyses of new regula-
tions; the Congressional Review Act, authorizing expedited passage by Congress of 
a bill to rescind an agency regulation (though still requiring passage by both houses 
of Congress and signature by the President, hence rarely used); and a law calling for 
20 Some US federal agencies are called ‘independent’, because the President’s power to remove 
the agency head is restricted; it remains an unresolved question whether the President can require 
those agencies to comply with the IA process and OIRA oversight.
21 Compare Breyer (1993) (worrying about agencies’ tunnel vision and excessive regulation), 
with Revesz and Livermore (2008) (worrying that agencies may regulate too little). 
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annual reports by OMB/OIRA to the Congress on the aggregate costs and benefi ts of 
federal regulation over the last decade. But, in general, after having created OIRA, 
Congress has not strongly favored regulatory oversight – especially of its own leg-
islative enactments. Congress has no ROB of its own equipped to carry out such a 
function. In the 1980s, some in Congress resisted the Presidency’s eff orts to oversee 
regulation through OMB/OIRA. The Congress considered, but not did enact, broad 
regulatory reform legislation in the mid- 1990s. Congress even de- funded its own expert 
advisory bodies, the Offi  ce of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the Administrative 
Conference of the US (ACUS).
3.2. The location of the IAB in the EU structure of government
The EU has a hybrid system. In contrast to the US system, in which the roles of the 
principals (the Congress, the Presidency) and the agents (the federal agencies) are 
fairly easy to identify, with lateral oversight by the courts and internal oversight by the 
President’s executive offi  ce (OIRA), in the EU the roles of principals and agents are 
more fragmented and interwoven across several institutions. These include the European 
Commission exercising internal oversight through its Secretariat- General, its inter- 
service consultation practices, and its new IAB; the Council of the EU; the European 
Parliament; and the member states; with lateral oversight by bodies such as the 
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Auditors (which reviews the budget), 
and the European Ombudsman (which can investigate ‘maladministration’) (Lindseth 
et al. 2008, Alemanno 2009).22 Indeed, in the last ten years the European Commission 
has undertaken a sweeping eff ort to introduce better regulatory oversight mechanisms, 
mainly to further European economic competitiveness.23
The ROB in the EU that most closely corresponds to the US OMB/OIRA is the 
European Commission’s relatively new Impact Assessment Board (IAB), created in late 
2006, and located in the Commission’s Secretariat- General under the direct authority 
of the Commission President. The IAB is composed of fi ve high- level offi  cials, in par-
ticular, the Deputy Secretary- General of the Commission, and four Directors coming 
from four Directorates- General: DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, DG 
Employment, Social Aff airs and Equal Opportunities, and DG Economic and Financial 
Aff airs (Alemanno 2008).24 The IAB has some expert staff , but the fi ve members meet 
periodically; and the DGs represented on the IAB may be proponents of policies being 
reviewed by the IAB. The IAB’s location in the Commission is on its face similar to the 
location of US OIRA within the executive branch, but the European Commission’s 
distinctive role as the sole institution empowered to introduce legislation gives its IA 
process oversight of legislative, rather than exclusively administrative, action. Thus, 
22 Under Article 228 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (former Article 195 EC), the Ombudsman may investigate complaints from EU citizens in 
instances of maladministration, ‘with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance acting in their judicial role’.
23 See Lofstedt et al. (2008: 135) (observing that the EU has done more on regulatory reform 
from 1998–2008 than it had in all the years from 1956–97) and Wiener (2006).
24 To know more on the IAB, see Alemanno (2008). See also the Commission Staff  Working 
Paper, ‘Impact Assessment Board – Report for the year 2007’, COM (2008) 32 fi nal.
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the Commission has created an internal, quasi- specialized, executive/legislative ROB to 
oversee eff ective compliance by the Commission with IA requirements.
3.3. Comparing oversight structures across the Atlantic
The diff erent approach to the structure of oversight in the EU system compared to the 
US derives from the diff erent structures of governance. In the US, legislation begins 
in the Congress, a political body, which enacts statutes and can thereby create regula-
tory agencies and delegate tasks to these agencies. The agencies possess technocratic 
expertise that the Congress lacks, and Congress often relies on the agencies to determine 
essential issues such as the appropriate level of protection of health and environment. 
OIRA in turn is also a highly technical body, staff ed by professional experts, that reports 
to the President. The heads of the agencies and the head of OIRA are all appointed by 
the President, but nonetheless it is sometimes a challenge for the Presidency to steer 
the policy direction of the agencies, each of which has its own constituencies among the 
public and in Congressional committees, and some of whose heads are legally shielded 
from being easily removed by the President. Regulatory oversight through OIRA is one 
means for the President to manage the multi- headed regulatory state (E. Kagan 2001). 
Thus in the US, OIRA is a politically accountable body that exercises technocratic 
review of regulatory power delegated by Congress to the federal agencies.
In the EU, by contrast, legislation begins exclusively in the Commission, which is 
mainly a technical executive body, although the political accountability and authority 
of the Commission’s president is growing. (The Commission’s President is not popu-
larly elected like the US President, but rather is appointed by the European Council 
and subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament.) ‘Agencies’ such as the 
European Environment Agency or European Food Safety Authority exist in the EU, 
but, being judicially barred from exercising delegated regulatory authority,25 their main 
function is to engage in preparatory executive acts under direct Commission oversight.26 
Regulatory power is exercised by the DGs (such as DG Environment), subject to their 
proposals for Directives and Regulations being adopted by the full Commission. The 
Commission proposes new legislative initiatives to the Council and the Parliament, both 
political bodies. The Council is made up of the relevant ministers of the member states 
– a kind of legislature composed of national- level executives – and the Parliament is a 
large legislature composed of elected representatives, seated by party not by member 
state. The adage is that ‘the Commission proposes, the Council disposes’. Yet these 
institutions also operate in a complex relationship of delegation and cooperation, the 
framework of ‘comitology’, that is, the committee system which oversees the delegated 
acts  implemented by the European Commission (Saurer, Chapter 36, this volume).
25 Although the European Court of Justice recognized the need for delegated legislation in 
Meroni (case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority), it limited signifi cantly the possibility of delegating 
regulatory authority. The idea is that agency decisions should not entail any use of regulatory dis-
cretion beyond a purely technical evaluation of the applications against fi xed criteria. For a recent 
critique of the ‘Meroni doctrine’, see Majone (2010).
26 For an introduction to the EU Agencies, see Communication from the Commission, 
The Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM(2002) 718 fi nal; 
Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies, 
presented by the EC Commission, 25/02/05, COM(2005) 59 fi nal; Gilardi (2002: 873), Chiti (2000).
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Moreover, within the Commission and its DGs, many staff  and observers point to a 
tradition of collaborative harmony or collegiality rather than adversarial or hierarchi-
cal relations; the ‘College of Commissioners’ (each from a diff erent member state, and 
appointed together as a slate) makes its decisions in a consensual style. This emphasis 
on harmony and collegiality may derive from several factors, among them the original 
purpose of the European Community to heal and unify the continent. This may also be 
related to the substantially smaller and more close- knit size of the Commission compared 
to the larger US multi- agency administration. This collegiality within the Commission 
stands in contrast to the more hierarchical relationship in the US executive branch 
between OIRA (and the White House generally) and the federal agencies it oversees. 
Although the IAB has the power to comment on the quality of the IA accompanying a 
DG’s policy proposal, the IAB does not (yet) have the explicit power to reject a policy 
proposal – that power is held by the College of Commissioners as a whole. Perhaps the 
IAB’s power to infl uence policy decisions will accrete over time, as the President of 
the Commission becomes more powerful (an issue currently in fl ux with the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009) and as technocratic review of regulatory policy becomes 
more customary in Europe. Even today internal debates do occur. Whatever its origins, 
this collegial style may help explain the more limited powers of the IAB, compared to 
OIRA, to reject or ‘return’ impact assessments and policy proposals to the agencies 
(Allio 2007b: 5). On the other hand, the persuasive infl uence of the IAB’s report may 
induce the proponent DG to improve its IA or its policy (Alemanno 2008: 70). The 
Secretariat- General may also issue a negative opinion on a policy.27 In the US, by con-
trast, there is a strong tradition of using adversarial debate to test and shape decisions, 
not only in courts but also in the executive and legislative branches (R. Kagan 2001).
Thus in the EU, the IAB reviews proposals from its own technical administrative 
branch of government (the Commission), in a setting that softens overt discord, before 
those proposals go to the political branches for assent (and then often to the member 
states for implementation). The structural role of regulatory ‘oversight’ is thus diff er-
ent in the EU, where legislation comes initially from the technical branch and where 
the Commission internally follows a collegial structure and style, than it is in the US. 
In the US, legislation comes initially from the most political branch, and the agencies 
occupy a position that, functionally at least, bridges the gap between the Congress and 
the Presidency. In the US, the ROB is a mechanism for the Presidency to manage the 
administrative state through technocratic expertise in a hierarchical structure.
3.4. Plural ROBs
Oversight need not be limited to a single ROB in each national or supranational admin-
istrative system. Plural oversight could involve several ROBs, each located in a diff erent 
part of the regulatory structure. Indeed, the US has not only OIRA in the executive (and 
direct presidential power itself), but also interagency consultation, potent judicial review, 
numerous scientifi c advisory bodies, and always the possibility of a regulation being 
mandated or blocked by act of Congress, as well as a system of cooperative federalism 
with the 50 states. Meanwhile, the EU has the new IAB in the Commission, but also 
27 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, updated March 2006, pp. 14–15.
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aspects of oversight exercised by several other institutions, including inter- service con-
sultation among the DGs, as well as the Council, the Parliament, the Ombudsman, the 
Court of Auditors, and the Court of Justice, and the 27 member states themselves. The 
optimal number and location of ROBs seem likely to diff er from system to system and to 
depend on each polity’s own constitutional features.
Oversight can also be located in networks of internal or external communities of 
experts. For example, interagency working groups can supply oversight. These include 
the former RARG in the Carter administration, and interagency consultation on pro-
posed actions, as under the EU system of Inter- service Consultation, and the US system 
of interagency consultation on IAs submitted to OIRA.28 The European Commission 
IAB itself builds on the pre- existing system of inter- service consultation on DGs’ 
impact assessments (Alemanno 2008, Allio 2007b). Additionally, external or quasi- 
governmental networks of nongovernmental experts, such as science advisory bodies, 
and public comment can provide infl uential advice (Jasanoff  1990, Morgan and Peha 
2003, Graham 1991).
One can, of course, always ask if such external bodies actually infl uence government 
decisions. ROBs themselves may have external advisory bodies. For example, the UK 
Better Regulation (BR) Executive has had its BR Task Force, which then became the BR 
Commission, and is now being converted to the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council 
(OECD 2007a, chapter 3). Neither the US OIRA nor the EU IAB has a standing external 
advisory body, but such an external body has been called for by some members of the 
Commission29 and has recently been required by the European Parliament.30 Such calls 
could soon be amplifi ed, should the European courts show any readiness to conduct 
judicial review of the EU Institutions’ compliance with Better Regulation procedures.31
4. Mandate and tasks
4.1. Mandate
The mandate of any ROB is usually set forth in its enabling document. Its mission may 
be limited to quality control of impact assessments and other evaluative tools, or it may 
have the authority to inhibit undesirable policies (e.g. via ‘return’ letters), promote desir-
able policies (e.g. via ‘prompt’ letters), and conduct ex post (retrospective) evaluation in 
28 This also includes interagency consultation on Environmental IAs submitted to EPA and 
CEQ under NEPA, and interagency consultation on biological opinions submitted to DOI/FWS 
under the Endangered Species Act.
29 Keynote Speech by Commissioner G. Verheugen, ‘Better Legislation in the EU’, delivered 
at the European Conference on Subsidiarity during the Austrian Presidency, April 19, 2006 (‘what 
we need is the independent validation of impact assessment’).
30 Report on Better Regulation in the European Union prepared by the Committee on Legal 
Aff airs of the European Parliament (Rapporteur: Katalin Levai, 2007/2095(INI)) as a motion for 
an EP Resolution. See A6- 0273/2007, para. 6.
31 For example, in Spain v. Council (2006), the European Court of Justice held that failure 
to produce an IA to support a regulatory decision may lead to a violation of the ‘proportional-
ity’ principle of EU law. See Case C- 310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union 
(2006) (holding that failure to conduct an IA might, in certain circumstances, be a breach of the 
 proportionality principle); see Alemanno (2009).
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order to foster learning and policy revision. Ancillary missions may also include capacity 
building, training, and strategic planning of future policies.
The type of authority accorded to an ROB may depend importantly on the source of 
its authority, that is, on the institution that created the ROB. For example, authority 
conferred by a statute enacted by the legislature may have broader application to reviews 
of future legislation, whereas authority conferred by order of the President or Prime 
Minister may be confi ned to oversight within the executive branch, though this distinc-
tion itself depends on the constitutional structure of the government.
4.2. Tasks
Depending on their mandates, ROBs may perform a variety of functions or tasks. 
Neither OIRA’s nor IAB’s missions are limited to quality control. Although their pri-
ority task is to review the quality of impact assessments, they enjoy a larger array of 
powers. These include:
Inhibiting undesirable policies OIRA has sought to inhibit the adoption of undesirable 
policies since 1981 using return letters to the federal agencies.32 Unlike OIRA, the IAB 
has no veto power over the IAs conducted by the Commission DGs. However, the IAB 
may ask the relevant DG to resubmit a revised version of the original IA.33 Thus, while 
it is true that the IAB itself cannot veto a fl awed IA draft, its (negative) opinion may 
produce some relevant, though indirect, eff ects on the outcome of the quality control 
process. In particular, the Secretariat- General may block an initiative if the IAB opinion 
has not been taken into account by the DG author of the IA. This may occur to the 
extent that the Secretariat- General, unlike the IAB, enjoys this sort of veto power.
The question is then how far ROBs may go in inhibiting undesirable policies. OIRA 
can issue return letters, but under the EO, the agency can then appeal to a more senior 
administration offi  cial (such as the Vice President or the White House Chief of Staff ). Can 
the ROB go to court, or be challenged in court? In the US, courts usually do not enforce 
Presidential executive orders against executive agencies, but they will require agencies to 
abide by Congressional statutes, which may aff ect regulatory oversight in various direc-
tions (including enforcing legislative requirements to conduct IA, enforcing legislative 
prohibitions on some types of analysis, and enforcing legislative time limits on agency 
action notwithstanding ongoing OIRA review). As for the EU, the European Courts 
may be starting to enforce such requirements.34 Indeed, despite the Commission’s eff orts 
to dismiss any attempt to legalize the Better Regulation requirements, these require-
ments, by dictating a more informed and more inclusive method of decision- making, are 
expected to infl uence public expectations, thus encouraging stakeholders to act in order 
to ensure their implementation by the Commission. Not only are private parties willing 
to challenge the correctness of IAs carried out by the Commission services, but it may be 
that the ECJ is ready to rely on IAs to determine a possible breach of a general principle 
of law, such as the principle of proportionality (Alemanno 2009).
32 Executive Order 12866. See, in particular, section 6(b).
33 See IA Guidelines 2009, p. 10. 
34 Case C- 310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union (2006) (holding that 
failure to conduct an IA is a breach of the proportionality principle); see Alemanno (2009). 
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Promoting desirable policies OIRA began to issue ‘prompt’ letters to promote desirable 
new policies in 2001.35 Rather than being sent in response to the regulators’ submission 
of a draft rule for ROB review, a ‘prompt’ letter is sent on the ROB’s own initiative, and 
contains a suggestion for how the regulator (be it an agency or a DG) could improve its 
regulations. The prompt letter, at least as developed by OIRA, does not mandate agency 
action; it only suggests a prima facie case for action based on an initial benefi t- cost assess-
ment showing that such new agency action could increase net benefi ts. For example, one 
of OIRA’s fi rst prompt letters was to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
asking FDA to consider a new rule requiring the listing of trans- fat content on the nutri-
tion labels on packaged foods.
Yet the issuance of prompt letters by OIRA has been episodic and ad hoc. There is 
not yet a system in place to help OIRA generate prompt letters as routinely as OIRA 
currently reviews agency proposals and potentially issues return letters. One option 
would be an external advisory body to OIRA, or a new panel of the National Academy 
of Sciences, or both, that would generate candidate prompt letters.36 An interagency 
working group could play a similar role. Another option would permit nongovern-
mental organizations to appeal to OIRA to issue a prompt letter if an agency denies a 
 rulemaking petition (Revesz and Livermore 2008).
In Europe, the IAB’s Mandate and Rules of Procedure also speak of ‘prompt’ letters, 
but, unlike in the US context, they are prompts to conduct an IA, not to develop a 
regulation.37 The current blanket application of IAs to all items on the Commission’s 
Work Program (CLWP) does not necessarily cover all proposals with the most signifi -
cant impacts.38 Hence prompt letters might have the potential to fi ll this gap. Following 
the establishment of the IAB, the Secretariat- General is in charge of identifying as early 
as possible items that are not included in the CLWP, but which could benefi t from IA. 
When the IAB shares the opinion of the Secretariat- General, it may prompt, though not 
require, the relevant department to undertake an IA.
Information burdens and quality The ROB may also oversee the administrative burden 
of governmental requests for information. This was the objective of the US Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1980 that created OIRA, and the original reason for the ‘I’ in OIRA. It 
is also the objective of the eff orts at administrative burden reduction by many European 
governments. Meanwhile, the ROB may also oversee the quality of information pro-
duced by government agencies, as under the US Information Quality Act of 2001.39
35 OIRA has issued several prompt letters to agencies in this way since 2001. For more about 
the genesis and rationale of this device, see Graham (2007a). OIRA posts its prompt letters online 
at http://www.reginfo.gov /public/jsp/EO/promptLetters.jsp.
36 See Committee of Past Presidents, Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), Recommendations to 
OMB on Regulatory Review, March 16, 2009, Recommendation no. 7, p. 9, available at http://sra.
org/OMB_regulatory_review.php.
37 IAB Mandate, point 4 and Article 6 of the IAB Rules.
38 Thus, for instance, among the initiatives which are not a priori subject to IA, there are non- 
priority list CLWP items and certain implementing measures such as comitology decisions.
39 Information Quality Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106- 554, § 515, codifi ed at 44 USC 3516 
(Note) (directing OMB to issue guidelines that ‘provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal 
agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information 
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Capacity building Both OIRA and the IAB are instructed to help agencies and DGs to 
perform better IAs. In particular, they may perform this task by issuing guidelines on how 
to conduct IA40 and also engage in early collaboration to shape the rule toward increasing 
net benefi ts – not just waiting to receive the proposed rule and then critiquing it.41
5. Rules of procedure
To fully exercise its tasks and discharge its mandate, any oversight body must act within 
the framework of a set of procedural rules. The specifi c rules of procedure of an ROB 
can be important in determining its eff ectiveness, quality, and perceived legitimacy 
(Rose- Ackerman 1995). US OMB/OIRA follows rules of procedure established in EO 
12866, including rules regarding the timetable to review agency IAs, the transparency of 
OIRA’s contacts with outside parties, and the opportunity for an agency to appeal an 
OIRA decision. EO 12866 (September 1993) replaced the earlier EO 12291 (February 
1981), and signifi cantly changed OIRA’s rules of procedure, notably by requiring much 
greater transparency. The European Commission’s IAB has rules of procedure issued in 
early 2007, governing the composition and voting of the fi ve- member IAB, the timing of 
reviews of IAs, transparency of IAB deliberations, and sources of internal and external 
expertise. In addition, US OMB has guidelines for impact assessment, mainly in Circular 
A- 4, September 2003, as does the European IAB, mainly in its IA Guidelines of January 
15, 2009. OIRA also issued guidelines for good risk analysis (jointly with Offi  ce of 
Science and Technology Policy – OSTP, in September 2007).
5.1. Leadership of the ROB: number and affi  liation
US OIRA is headed by a single Administrator, who is assisted by career staff  members. 
By contrast, the EU IAB is a fi ve- member board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary- 
General responsible for regulatory matters, with four additional members who are senior 
offi  cials of key DGs.42 The IAB’s rules say that its members are supposed ‘to act inde-
pendently of the policy making departments’ notwithstanding its members’ affi  liation of 
origin.43 This might seem odd to the extent that, besides the Deputy Secretary General 
who chairs it, the board’s other four members are appointed by the Directors General 
heading the DGs to which these four IAB members belong. In other words, they are 
appointed to a body to oversee the DGs by their own bosses at the DGs.44 Yet, perhaps 
surprisingly, during its fi rst four years of activity, the IAB has been perceived as reason-
ably impartial and independent. One may venture to suggest that the main driving force 
behind this positive development is a reputational factor: IAB members know that their 
professional future is linked to the success of the IAB; hence they have an incentive to 
defend their own name and expertise by privileging an impartial and consistent approach 
in analyses rather than acting to favour their home DGs.
. . . disseminated by Federal agencies’). OMB issued its guidelines in December 2001; see 67 Fed. 
Reg. 8452 (republication of February 22, 2002).
40 See OIRA Circular A- 4 (September 2003), and the EU IAB Mandate 2005, point 6.
41 See Graham (2007); IA Guidelines 2009: 10; IA Rules of procedure, Article 5.3.
42 For a critique of the actual IAB membership, see Alemanno (2008: 70).
43 COM(2006) 689, 8.
44 See Article 1, para. 3, of the Rules of Procedures.
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It remains to be seen whether a fi ve- member board can operate eff ectively to review 
IAs, compared to OIRA’s single Administrator (irrespective of the home affi  liations 
of the IAB members). The IAB’s self- evaluation in early 2008 sought to allay these 
concerns. The audit exercise by the European Court of Auditors on the EU IA system, 
which is currently ongoing, is expected to provide some recommendations on the IAB’s 
institutional membership.45
5.2. Time to review
In the US OIRA, the time for review extends up to 90 days from the receipt of a pro-
posed rule. In the EU IAB, the time to review extends at least 30 days before inter- service 
consultation begins. Too short a time period may make meaningful review of complex 
IAs diffi  cult or impossible. But too long a time period may impose unwarranted delay on 
needed new rules and may undermine morale. In the US in the late 1990s, a signifi cant 
number of proposed rules had waiting times longer than 90 days. In 2001 and 2002, 
OIRA made substantial progress in reducing the time for review below 90 days.46 In 
2008, the IAB has uploaded its opinions on time in almost 80% of the cases.47
5.3. Who can participate in review
The EU IAB rules expressly allow the IAB to solicit advice from outside experts. OIRA 
can receive communications from parties outside government (so long as they are identi-
fi ed in its docket), but does not seem to have the standard practice of soliciting advice 
from outside experts. Both the IAB and OIRA have processes of inter- service (or intera-
gency) consultation on proposed rules.
5.4. Opportunity for the regulatory agency to be heard and to hear critiques
EO 12866 calls for the agency proposing the rule to be invited to have a representative 
present whenever OIRA staff  meet with an outside party about the rule. Under the IAB 
rules of procedure, during the meeting between the IAB and the author DG, the latter is 
represented by the head of the relevant unit and a support offi  cial.
5.5. Appeals to higher authority
EO 12866 provided that disputes over a return letter could be appealed to a cabinet- level 
committee chaired by the Vice President. Under the George W. Bush administration, 
this responsibility was shifted from the Vice President to the President’s Chief of Staff . In 
the EU, a DG may appeal to the full Commission from an IAB opinion or Secretariat- 
General decision.
5.6. Infl uence of statutory deadlines
In the US, a statutory deadline or a court- ordered deadline for rulemaking will force 
the agency to act (e.g. to publish a rule) even if OIRA has not yet completed its review. 
A similar constraint does not exist in the EU, where IA is not mandatory, being 
45 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council on Better 
Regulation, December 3–4, 2009.
46 See US GAO (2003).
47 Impact Assessment Board Report for 2008 (2008: 9).
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contained not in statutes but in soft law acts, such as guidelines,48 and where some IAs 
are conducted regarding the Commission’s proposals for legislation which have no time 
deadline.
5.7. Public access to information about the review
Rules of procedure not only dictate each stage of the examination undertaken by the 
ROB, but also introduce transparency requirements. In the US, agency rulemaking is 
already public, pursuant to the APA, with notices of proposed rulemaking, proposed 
rules, and fi nal rules all published in the Federal Register and now also online. EO 12866 
added transparency provisions to ensure public awareness of the OIRA process, includ-
ing a record of those who met with OIRA regarding each rule. During the George W. 
Bush administration, in contrast to eff orts to withhold information in some other parts 
of the administration, OIRA went further than required by EO 12866 and posted all of 
its return letters, prompt letters, guidelines, and almost all other important documents 
on its public web site.49
In the EU, the location of IAB review in the regulatory process limits the transparency 
of its activities. Article 16 of the IAB Rules of Procedure seems to ensure transparency 
to the extent that it requires the Board to make available its draft agendas, meeting 
records, opinions, prompt- letters, and notes signed by the chair on behalf of the IAB as 
quickly as possible to all Commission departments. At the same time, it ensures public 
access to the Board’s documents by subjecting them to principles and conditions as 
laid down in Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents.50 Although all IAB opinions must be available 
to all Commission services,51 they are released, through a publication on the IAB page 
within the Europa website, only when the Commission has adopted the corresponding 
proposal. This is automatically done by the IAB as the sole owner of its opinions. If 
the IAB opinions were to become public before the fi nal adoption of the Commission 
proposal, this would lead to a situation in which an IAB opinion on a draft IA would be 
disclosed before the Commission proposal itself, thus inevitably disclosing the contents 
of the latter. However, the lack of publication of the draft IA report, combined with 
the delayed disclosure of its fi nal version, make it diffi  cult to determine, after the fact, 
the exact object and infl uence of the IAB review This may only be inferred by reading the 
published fi nal IA report from the DG, in the light of the suggestions contained within 
the IAB opinion.
6. Scope of oversight
ROBs may address a wide array of regulatory activities, including proposals for new 
regulations, the stock of existing regulations, proposals for new statutes and legislative 
48 On the legal status of RIA in the EU, see Alemanno (2009). 
49 See the OIRA website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_aff airs/default/, the 
OIRA Regulatory Matters website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regmatters/, and 
US GAO (2003).
50 Regulation 2001/1049 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, OJ 
L 145, p. 43.
51 Article 6 of the Rules.
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acts, information requests, and others. They may oversee the full span of government 
actors, or only a subset.
6.1. Timing: ex ante and expost
Most ROBs focus mainly on the fl ow of new regulations while giving less attention to the 
existing stock of rules. Thus, both US OIRA and EU IAB focus on ex ante impact assess-
ment of new regulations, with only occasional attention to the stock of existing rules, or 
to retrospective ex post IAs of previously adopted rules. Yet, ex post review would be 
useful to identify needed policy revisions, and to assess and improve the accuracy of ex 
ante IAs (Wiener 2006, Harrington et al. 2000).
6.2. Administrative costs
Some ROBs do focus on the burden of existing rules and are less concerned with new 
regulations. Countries that have sought to reduce administrative burdens have taken this 
approach. Many employ the Standard Cost Model (SCM), compliance cost evaluations, 
‘simplifi cation’, and ‘regulatory budgets’ to reduce paperwork burdens. The Netherlands 
has been a leader in this area (OECD 2007b), but the UK has also made major strides in 
reducing administrative burdens on the private sector.52
Despite the widespread enthusiasm for cutting red tape, it is not always obvious that 
cutting administrative burdens is desirable. Subjecting administrative burdens to a 
benefi t- cost test (as for other regulations) would be superior to simply enforcing arbi-
trary burden reduction targets. Information- based regulations can be warranted in some 
cases (OECD 2007b, Wiener 2006:500- 01). The European Commission recognized this in 
its revised IA Guidelines on March 15, 2006, stating in Box 11 that:
The fact that one option would impose lower administrative costs is not in itself a suffi  cient 
reason to prefer it. For example, a measure .  .  . likely to impose relatively fewer administra-
tive costs [by mandating specifi c technical standards, instead of requiring labels that disclose 
product data] . . . could give manufacturers less fl exibility and could reduce consumer choice, 
[so that] its overall costs may be higher than the ‘administrative’ requirement to display data . . .
Information collection and disclosure rules, such as product labelling, the US Toxics 
Release Inventory, and similar pollution discharge registries, may be especially cost- 
eff ective ways to protect society (Hamilton 2005, Sand 2010).
6.3. Topical areas of regulation
In principle, an ROB could oversee all regulation, covering all topics. In practice, 
ROBs often focus only on one type of regulation, such as rules imposing administrative 
burdens (information collection costs). ROBs often focus on health, safety, security and 
environmental regulations (sometimes called ‘social regulation’ or ‘risk regulation’), 
while sometimes having curtailed powers or less emphasis in the areas of banking, 
fi nance, competition, trade, and other ‘economic regulation’. In some countries, sensitive 
areas such as defense or taxation/fi scal policy (Mexico, for example) are exempt from the 
review process.
52 See UK House of Commons, Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘Getting Results: The BRE 
and its Regulatory Reform Agenda’ (July 2008).
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Expanding the ROB’s scope could bring the benefi ts of oversight to those areas and 
could also help correct the misimpression that oversight tools, such as benefi t- cost analy-
sis, are biased against the subjects of their current narrow application. For example, 
extending benefi t- cost analysis beyond social regulation to cover economic regulation 
and government- funded projects would help demonstrate that benefi t- cost analysis need 
not be biased against health or the environment. Benefi t- cost analysis would then be 
deployed to assess environmentally damaging projects such as dams, deforestation, and 
power plants – as it had been in its early uses decades ago (Kneese 2000, Hufschmidt 
2000).53 Early in the modern environmental movement, benefi t- cost analysis was seen as 
a useful tool for environmental protection when applied to the evaluation of projects in 
the US and elsewhere.54 At the same time, expanding the scope of oversight could stretch 
ROBs’ capacity, and could bring ROBs into confl ict with other institutions already 
active in those areas.
In the US, OIRA has emphasized impact assessment of proposed new regulations 
addressing health, safety, and environmental risks. Over the last several years (at least 
since September 11, 2001), it began to address proposed new regulations of homeland 
security risks as well. On a related front, OIRA could expand its mandate to oversee 
international treaty commitments (via impact assessments); the US State Department 
has recently proposed requiring agencies to consult with OMB/OIRA on the regulatory 
impacts of pending new international agreements,55 and the State Department already 
requires agencies to consult with OMB before making new budgetary commitments in 
international agreements.56 In Europe, many ROBs at the national level consider the 
national impact of proposed EU- wide policies.
ROBs could extend their role further, addressing existing as well as new regulations. 
They could address decisions not to regulate, or to deregulate, as well as to regulate,57 
and also assess economic policies and projects. For example, a US statute, section 201 
of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC 2251(a), already calls for benefi t- cost analysis of trade 
measures, but this law has not been implemented by OIRA.58
Another area of potential expanded scope for regulatory oversight is the banking, 
fi nance and insurance sector, as well as fi scal policies. In many countries, these policies 
are handled in a separate way and are not subject to regulatory quality oversight. For 
example, in the US, fi scal spending and taxation policy has traditionally been handled 
53 See the Federal Flood Control Act of 1936 (requiring that the ‘benefi ts to whomsoever they 
may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs’, 33 USC § 701(a)).
54 See, for example, Berkman and Viscusi (1973) (using BCA to critique federal dams); 
Calvert Cliff s Co- ordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F 2d 1109 (DC Cir 1971) (fi nding that the 
Environmental IA provision in NEPA section 102(2)(C) requires benefi t- cost analysis of federal 
projects such as nuclear power plants, in order to take into account their previously neglected 
environmental costs), cert denied, 404 US 942 (1972).
55 71 Fed. Reg. 28831 (May 18, 2006).
56 See 22 CFR § 181.4(e).
57 See Revesz and Livermore (2008). This may already be the practice at OIRA.
58 See on this point, Review of the Application of EU and US Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Guidelines on the Analysis of Impacts on International Trade and Investment, Final Report and 
Conclusion, prepared by the OMB and Secretariat- General of the EU Commission, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/sg- omb_fi nal.pdf.
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by the budget side of OMB (and at the CBO), whereas OIRA is on the management 
side. Banking and fi nance regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve Bank 
have not been subject to regular OIRA oversight, although policies of the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which governs among other things the 
mortgage loans made by Fannie Mae, have been subject to OIRA review. The mort-
gage and credit crisis of 2008–10, and the dramatic move to restructure the banking 
and fi nancial markets to rescue the economy from this crisis in the US and Europe, 
suggest that past choices by markets and regulators have been suboptimal, to say the 
least. This implies that this area could benefi t from oversight on benefi t- cost criteria 
by ROBs.
6.4. Types of legal action
ROBs diff er in the type of legal action they oversee. This may include legislation, rule-
making, guidance documents and other avenues. Under section 3(b) of EO 12866, US 
OIRA oversight is limited to regulations promulgated by federal executive agencies. 
From January 2007 to January 2009, EO 13422 added review of guidance documents 
issued by these same agencies. By contrast, in Europe, the IA Guidelines and IAB 
oversight apply to legislation proposed by the European Commission, and indeed to all 
matters in the Commission’s annual Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP).59 The 
nature of the US institutional system, with its separation of powers, precludes OIRA 
review from being meaningfully extended to cover legislation (although the executive 
branch could prepare IAs of pending legislation as a way to infl uence legislators or to 
inform the President’s veto decisions). Perhaps a new ROB, attached to the Congress, 
could be established to supervise impact assessment of legislation proposed in the 
Congress. To the extent that agency regulations warrant oversight, in many cases a 
large share of their costs and benefi ts derive from the underlying legislation impelling 
the agency to issue that regulation. As noted above, CBO estimates the fi scal impacts 
of new laws on government spending and revenues, but does not focus on private costs 
and benefi ts. This underlines the need for IA and oversight of regulatory quality within 
legislatures. In many countries, fi nding an oversight mechanism to enable Parliament 
to conduct and heed impact assessments on its own legislative proposals, and ex post 
assessments of laws already enacted, could help fi ll signifi cant gaps. The adoption of 
such a mechanism would, however, face political obstacles because it threatens to make 
transparent the distribution of costs and benefi ts posed by legislation. It is interesting to 
observe that a debate is currently under way in the EU on whether the scope of regula-
tory oversight should be narrowed because the current regime is suff ering from its own 
success in producing too many IAs.
59 Some important decisions handled through ‘comitology’ may fall outside this scope of 
review, but the IAB is expressly authorized to reach out with a prompt letter to identify such deci-
sions warranting an IA. See IAB Mandate, point 4, at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/
docs/key_docs/iab_mandate_annex_sec_2006 _1457_3.pdf. 
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6.5. Selection of which regulations to review
Any ROB with limited oversight resources (staff , funding, time) must have some criteria 
for selecting which regulations to review. Most of the cost of conducting IAs falls on 
the agencies or DGs that wish to promulgate rules, because they prepare the initial IAs 
which the ROB (OIRA or the IAB) then reviews. But the ROB must also have the capac-
ity, and some selection or triage mechanism, to use its own scarce resources eff ectively.
In the US, section 3(f) of EO 12866 makes the cut by using a threshold of the mag-
nitude of impact, requiring an IA for any regulation imposing $100 million or more in 
impacts. In 2003, OIRA added the criterion that any regulation posing an impact exceed-
ing $1 billion should be accompanied by an IA using formal probabilistic scenarios to 
assess its impacts.
The European Commission takes a diff erent approach. Under its IA Guidelines, it 
employs the concept of ‘proportionate analysis’, meaning that the degree of analysis 
should be greater where the potential impacts of the regulation are larger. This approach 
avoids the sharp disjunctions and potential estimation errors of agencies’ eff orts to avoid 
review by undercounting impacts to come under the dollar- value thresholds used in 
the US. OIRA and the Offi  ce of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) endorsed the 
concept of proportionate analysis in 2007, saying ‘The depth or extent of the analysis of 
the risks, benefi ts and costs associated with a decision should be commensurate with the 
nature and signifi cance of the decision’.60
6.6. Analytic methods
As discussed above, ROBs can employ a variety of analytic methods in their reviews, 
and can ask agencies to use these methods in their regulatory IAs. Statutory restrictions 
sometimes limit the type of analysis that an agency may use in making its regulatory deci-
sions. For example, in the US, Congress has in some statutes required (or the courts so 
infer from statutory language) agencies to use benefi t- cost analysis in developing rules, 
but in some other statutes Congress has forbidden agencies to use benefi t- cost analy-
sis. One example is the setting of national ambient air quality standards under section 
109 of the Clean Air Act, where the courts have held that the statute forbids the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to consider cost.61 In such cases, the agency 
still prepares an impact assessment using benefi t- cost analysis for OIRA review under 
the EO, but the agency is not supposed to refer to or base its decisions on that analysis 
when it sets standards in the rule itself.62 In the early 1990s, Congress considered but did 
not enact a law including a ‘supermandate’ to require benefi t- cost analysis in all major 
rulemakings, notwithstanding prior statutory restrictions on such analysis. A diff erent 
option would be a legislative ‘superauthorization’, permitting but not requiring agencies 
to use benefi t- cost analysis in major rules notwithstanding prior statutory restrictions 
on such analysis. This approach was taken by Congress in one statute, the 1996 amend-
ments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, but has not yet been employed more broadly. In 
60 OMB/OIRA and OSTP Memorandum on Updated Principles of Risk Analysis, September 
19, 2007, p. 4.
61 See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 US 457 (2001). Apart from section 109, some 
other parts of the Clean Air Act allow EPA to consider costs.
62 See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 US 457, 471 n. 4 (2001).
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eff ect, a superauthorization of the analytic methods used in impact assessment would 
stand for a straightforward idea: Let the regulators think things through.
In the EU, where legislation is initiated by the Commission, and the Commission 
has committed itself to conduct impact assessments, there are no restrictions in par-
ticular pieces of legislation on the use of impact assessments. The EU Commission’s 
IA Guidelines require analysis of ‘positive and negative impacts’, but without imposing 
any specifi c methodology. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Article 191, expressly calls for analysis of benefi ts and costs only in setting envi-
ronmental standards. As a result, the IA conducted by DG Environment on the Clean 
Air for Europe (CAFÉ) policy – the EU counterpart of the US EPA’s ambient air quality 
standards – was an extensive analysis of benefi ts and costs that many regard as one of the 
best quality IAs prepared by the Commission to date.63
7. Conclusions
As governments around the globe become increasingly conscious of the need for better 
policy making, they establish regulatory oversight bodies and entrust these bodies with 
the mandate to supervise the quality of regulatory analysis and action. As our review 
of US and EU practice has shown, an ROB must be designed to suit the constitutional 
framework within which it is institutionally housed and also the philosophy of the regu-
latory improvement initiative that motivates its existence. Thus, the salient diff erences 
between OIRA in the US and IAB in Europe derive in part from the diff erent US and EU 
constitutional contexts, and from the diff erent purposes of their respective IA systems. 
Impact assessment in the US and the EU is conducted and reviewed at diff erent stages in 
the process, with diff erent powers and limitations, and for diff erent purposes. In the US, 
Congress instructs agencies to regulate; the President then requires agencies to conduct 
IAs to accompany proposed rules, and empowers OIRA, a body created by statute, to 
oversee the rules and to review the regulatory IAs. In the EU, IAs are conducted on a 
voluntary basis by the Commission, on all its policy and legislative proposals, and largely 
for its internal use; the IAs are then reviewed by the IAB within the Commission. As a 
result, whereas IA serves as an executive branch check on the exercise of legislatively 
delegated powers in the US system, it functions as a support for proposed legislation in 
the EU.
These features explain in part why the IAB appears to be a weaker regulatory gate-
keeper than OIRA. The US oversight body, having been conceived as a watchdog on leg-
islative (Congressional) pressure on agencies to regulate, was designed with a single head 
and entrusted with the power to issue return letters on proposed rules or IAs. It has since 
begun to issue ‘prompt’ letters to spur benefi cial new policies (rather than only checking 
proposals by the agencies). By contrast, the IAB, having been entrusted with improv-
ing the quality of legislative proposals, has an internal, multi- member, institutionally 
dependent representative board whose powers are mainly the ability to recommend that 
an IA should be redone and resubmitted to the IAB, and to communicate its views to 
the collegial Commission. Indeed, lacking veto power, the IAB cannot block, as could 
63 See CAFE references documents, at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/cafe/general/
keydocs.htm.
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OIRA, a DG draft IA or a policy proposal. Although the IAB appears by comparison 
with OIRA to be a weaker regulatory oversight body, its role is amplifi ed when seen in 
the context of the overall quality control mechanisms within the Commission.64 The 
IAB opinions may aff ect the policy outcome if they are invoked at the end of the review 
process by the Secretariat- General (or by a member of the Commission, or another EU 
institution) to question the underlying policy initiative. Moreover, the mere existence of 
the IAB seems to encourage DGs to better prepare their IAs to avoid a negative opinion. 
More broadly, the general availability of IAB opinions may encourage and support 
objections raised by concerned stakeholders or other institutions. The IAB may be exer-
cising a sort of ‘soft power’ within the existing oversight system. Although the long- term 
indirect eff ects of the IAB opinions are diffi  cult to predict, it is likely that these opinions 
will strengthen the overall eff ectiveness of the quality review system. The European regu-
latory oversight body seems designed to provide compliance incentives for the actors 
involved in the regulatory oversight process, consistent with the view that ‘to be eff ective, 
a system of regulation must create compliance incentives for regulated parties, rather 
than rely on corrective action and oversight’ (Elliott 1994).
Nevertheless, though the IAB has the potential to become the main ‘regulatory gate-
keeper’ within the EU quality control system, it does not yet have the explicit author-
ity to return or to prompt policy proposals. Moreover, it does not currently appear to 
be adequately equipped to undertake technically sophisticated reviews of DGs’ IAs or 
policy proposals, mainly due to: (a) the lack of eff ective rules ensuring the independence 
of IAB members; (b) too few resources to eff ectively undertake its mission; (c) a scarcity 
of staff  with technical expertise in impact assessment methodologies and in other dis-
ciplines relevant to the oversight activities; (d) the lack of retrospective evaluations to 
improve on the quality of its own opinions; and (e) insuffi  cient time to conduct careful 
reviews. While there is no doubt that the current IAB’s members are among the best 
IA experts among high- level offi  cials within the Commission departments, the current 
appointment rules do not seem to ensure that this result will be attained in the future. At 
the same time, the IAB should take advantage of its opportunities to seek both ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ expertise, and it should develop its own technical capabilities through 
the appointment of specialized staff  in the fi eld of economic, environmental and social 
impact assessment in order to strengthen its in- house expertise and, simultaneously, 
enhance its independence from the DGs it oversees.
Meanwhile, OIRA has been equipped with the explicit authority and expert staff  to 
carry out its traditional reviews and ‘return’ letters in response to ex ante IAs on agency 
proposals. In recent years, OIRA has moved to broaden its scope toward: earlier involve-
ment with the agency in developing a sound proposal; later ex post reviews of IAs to 
improve policies and improve assessment methods; ‘prompt’ letters that promote good 
regulation; and oversight of a wider array of types of regulation. The new EO anticipated 
from President Obama may point OIRA in new directions, roles, and analytic methods.
The emergence of ROBs in both the US and, more recently, the EU demonstrates 
the new transatlantic consensus on the desirability of regulatory oversight, at least at 
64 For an analyses of the overall quality control mechanisms existing within the Commission, 
see Alemanno (2008: 45–6). 
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the centers of government. An open question deserving further study is how eff ective 
the ROBs are at improving the quality of IAs and of regulatory policies. Does ‘better 
regulation’ actually yield better regulation?65 Each polity can now learn from the other’s 
experience to improve its performance. Where diff erences or disagreements arise, those 
can be addressed through dialogue and through careful comparison. Diff erences can be 
sources of insight and learning if their impacts are monitored, evaluated and shared over 
time. In that way, the US and EU can use the parallel development of their ROBs to 
engage in a ‘transatlantic policy laboratory’ that yields better regulatory results for both 
(Wiener 2010, 2009).
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